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In his recent book Our PosthumanFuture, Francis Fukuyama arguesthat advances in genetic engineering,neuroscience and psychopharmacol-
ogy threaten us with frightening new
potentials for physical and mental control
that might undermine the very free will and
rational judgment necessary to the emer-
gence and strengthening of democratic
systems of government.  As grim as this
prospect is (think of the recent remake of
The Manchurian Candidate, in which a
neural implant replaces the more labor-
intensive process of brainwashing), the
mechanisms of such control have struck
many readers as less likely than its intent.
In a review of Fukuyama’s book in the
New York Review of Books, prominent
evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin
dismissed the argument, scoffing that “The
remaking of human history by the techno-
logical manipulation of the human nervous
system belongs to the literature of science
fiction. . . .When it comes to having the
power to make history Fukuyama can have
the neuropharmacology laboratories.  I’ll
take the madrasas.”1
Madrasa.  The very word can send a
shudder up the post-9/11 spine, as these
Islamic religious schools –– purportedly the
training grounds for Islamist militants in
places like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia ––
have become part of the American vo-
cabulary.  As Lewontin demonstrates,
“madrasa” has become an index of threat
so clear that it requires no translation for
the reader of a book review concerning
recent work in the history of science.
American concern about madrasas
stretches back at least as far at the sum-
mer of 2000, when journalist Jeffrey
Goldberg published a feature article, “The
Education of a Holy Warrior,” in The New
York Times Magazine.2   The article
concerned the Haqqania madrasa (labeled
“Jihad U.” by the editors) in the Northwest
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Frontier Province of Pakistan, which had
provided young soldiers for the support of
the Taliban victory in Afghanistan.  A
shorter version of the article was published
in the first post-9/11 issue of Rolling
Stone,3  reaching a broader audience
nationwide.  Not to be outdone, on Novem-
ber 15, 2001, Thomas Friedman reported
on his own visit to Jihad U., in one of the
columns that helped him earn a Pulitzer
Prize for commentary the following April:
[Pakistan] is bin Laden land.  This is
not a region where America is going to
sink any friendly roots.  In part it’s
because the Pashtuns here all. . .side
with their brothers in Afghanistan; in
part it’s because they were jilted once
before by the Americans [who]
dropped Pakistan like a used hanky
once the Soviets left Afghanistan.
But, most important, it’s because of
the education system here.
On the way in to Peshawar I
stopped to visit the Darul Uloom
Haqqania, the biggest madrasa. . .in
Pakistan, with 2,800 live-in students –
– all studying the Quran and teach-
ings of the Prophet Muhammad with
the hope of becoming mullahs, or
spiritual leaders.  I was allowed to sit
in on a class with young boys, who
sat on the floor, practicing their rote
learning of the Quran from holy texts
perched on wooden holders.  This was
the core of their studies.  Most will
never be exposed to critical thinking or
modern subjects. . . .
Bin Laden is a sideshow, but one
we must deal with.  The real war for
peace in this region. . .is in the
schools.  Which is why we must do
our military operation against bin
Laden quickly and then get out of
here.
When we return, and we must, we
have to be armed with modern books
and schools –– not tanks.  Only then
might we develop a new soil –– a new
generation as hospitable to our
policies as to our burgers.
Until then, nothing pro-American
will grow here.
Anti-American sentiment in the Middle
East and the broader Muslim world is
unsettling.  The much-quoted Pew Re-
search Center Global Attitudes Project
reported in March 2004 that 61 percent of
Pakistanis, 63 percent of Turks and 68
percent of Moroccans had unfavorable
opinions of the United States.  But focusing
on Islamic education as a primary cause of
anti-American sentiment, global terrorism
or other forms of violence does a disser-
vice to our understanding of the challenges
we face in this new century.  Such a focus
doesn’t explain why unfavorable opinion of
our country in France and Germany (62
percent and 59 percent, respectively) is as
high as that in many parts of the Middle
East.  It doesn’t explain why the leaders
and ideologues of violent Islamist move-
ments almost always have secular higher
educations rather than the blinkered
backgrounds of Friedman and Goldberg’s
madrasa boys.4   And it doesn’t explain
why we choose to see Islamic schooling of
any sort as a direct motivator of behavior.
After all, we don’t blame French and
German schools for the views of their
citizens.  Why do we blame Middle East-
ern schools for the views of theirs, particu-
larly when such views are both irregularly
distributed and in constant flux?  The Pew
survey project found in May 2003 that
more than twice as many Moroccans as
Germans held “very favorable” views of
the United States.  Can there be more
madrasas in Bremen than in Marrakech?
122
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIII, NO. 1, SPRING 2006
I would argue that American fascina-
tion with madrasas and other Middle
Eastern educational institutions stems less
from their actual contribution to terrorism
than it does from our commonsense
understandings of causality, rationality and
the purposes of education. Friedman’s faith
that socialization is the key to understand-
ing and shaping human culture has a
distinguished genealogy.  In the 1930s, for
example, many anthropologists looked to
child-rearing practices to explain not only
the adjustment of individuals to their social
surroundings, but to explain the nature of
cultural difference itself.  Each culture, the
logic goes, like each person, has a more or
less integrated style of life, set of interests,
and capacity for perception and expres-
sion.  In the context of interwar psychol-
ogy, this insight along with a broader
interest in Freudian psychodynamics led to
a body of work that attempted to link child-
rearing practices to adult personality, and
thus to the social and cultural forms most
congenial to those average, or modal,
personality types.  Anthropologists and
psychologists sought to explain social
behaviors by tracing their origins to pat-
terns of infantile interaction with
caregivers, so that –– to give a well-known
example from the postwar period –– the
development of Russians’ attitudes toward
external authority, a potent mixture of guilt
and rage at constraints that are both
hateful and necessary, might be explained
by the common practice of infant swad-
dling.
This approach was eventually dis-
carded for making far too much of the
lasting effects of child-rearing practices.
But its underlying logic suffuses current
political concerns about Quranic schools.
Now it is no longer early childhood experi-
ence, but school experience, that is tar-
geted as the Very Core of Behavior.  They
hate us because they teach their children to
hate us.
THEY’LL LIKE US WHEN WE WIN
By early 2002, madrasa-talk had
spread from the journalism of Goldberg and
Friedman to the field of television drama,
where it began to be used without gloss or
elaboration as an index of Culture Gone
Bad.  Here, for example, is fictional White
House Communications Director Toby
Ziegler from the NBC television show The
West Wing (February 6, 2002):
They’ll like us when we win!  Thou-
sands of madrasas teaching children
nothing, nothing, nothing but the
Quran and to hate America.  Who do
we see about that?  Do I want to
preach America?  Judeo-Christianity?
No.  If their religion forbids them from
playing the trumpet, so be it.  But I
want those kids to look at a globe.  Be
exposed to social sciences, history.
Some literature.  [Long pause.]  They’ll
like us when we win.
From journalism and fiction the madrasa
jumped to policy.  In a confidential memo
to his senior staff dated October 16, 2003,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
asked,
Are we capturing, killing or deterring
and dissuading more terrorists every
day than the madrasas and the radical
clerics are recruiting, training and
deploying against us?  Does the U.S.
need to fashion a broad, integrated
plan to stop the next generation of
terrorists?... How do we stop those
who are financing the radical madrasa
schools?...  Does the CIA need a new
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finding?  Should we create a private
foundation to entice radical madrasas
to a more moderate course?
And, finally, Secretary of State Colin
Powell, during a radio interview on January
21, 2004:
We have been talking [to] Middle
Eastern leaders. . .and made it clear to
them that Islam is a great religion.  But
they also have to be educating their
youngsters not just in the tenets of
Islam…. [T]hey have to educate
[them]….for the demands of the
twenty-first century.  They’ve got to
give them skills.  They’ve got to teach
them to read and write.  They’ve got
to teach them science and math and all
the other things that are necessary for
societies to be successful in the
twenty-first century.
And if they’re just going to….put
[their young people] in these
madrasas. ….that do nothing but
indoctrinate them in the worst aspects
of a religion, then they are….leaving
themselves back as well as teaching
hatred that will not help us bring
peace to the region, and will not help
their societies.  And we’re working on
them….in this regard…. We’re helping
them to learn how to educate young-
sters for the twenty-first century.
Is education really the cause of
civilizational struggle?  Will particular sorts
of school curricula generate world peace,
and others world war?  Should we be
concerned, in national security (rather than
humanitarian) terms, about “messages of
hatred and. . .incitements for martyrdom in
[Saudi and Palestinian] textbooks and on
the media that take young minds and twist
and pervert them and create a new gen-
eration of terrorists and insurgents,” as
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D, NY)
told the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee at the end of May 2005?  This
is not the first time Westerners have
expressed concerns about the political
dangers nurtured by inadequate Semitic
systems of education.  For the sake of
historical and comparative perspective, two
of these examples, some six centuries
apart, can help frame the way we think
through these issues today.
CHIEF CAUSE OF THEIR PERFIDY
On the first Saturday of Lent, March 3,
1240, Dominican friars aided by Jewish
converts to Catholicism seized copies of
the Talmud and other Jewish books all over
Paris on the order of Pope Gregory IX.
On June 25, a royal court staged a trial of
the books on the charges of blasphemy
against God; slander against Jesus, Mary
and Christianity; and general foolishness.
The complaint had been made that the
Talmud was “the chief cause that holds
[Jews] in their perfidy.”5   In 1244, Pope
Innocent IV criticized the Talmud as a
book that “throw[s] away and despise[s]
the Law of Moses and the prophets, and
follow[s] some tradition of [the Jewish]
elders. . . .In traditions of this sort they
rear and nurture their children,”6  forbidding
them even to study their own Bible for fear
that their sons would become Christians if
they understood the true meaning of the
Mosaic teachings.7   The books were
condemned and 24 cartloads were burned
at the stake on Friday, June 6, 1242, an act
repeated again in Paris in 1309 and 1321,
as well as in Toulouse, Bourge and
Pamiers.8   Odo, a papal legate involved in
the investigation and prosecution of the
books, wrote in 1248, “We found that these
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books were full of innumerable errors,
abuses, blasphemies and wickedness such
as arouse shame in those who speak of
them and horrify the hearer, to such an
extent that these books cannot be tolerated
in the name of God without injury to the
Christian faith….and we decisively con-
demn them.”9
When the Talmud was not burned
publicly, it was sometimes ordered –– by
James I of Aragon, for example –– that the
Jews expunge whatever the Dominicans
took to be blasphemies against Jesus and
Mary.10   Gregory’s successor, Innocent IV,
the first Pope to refer to himself as the
Vicar of Christ, presided over an unprec-
edented extension of the legal authority of
the Apostolic See.  Not only was the
Bishop of Rome responsible for the moral
welfare of Christians, but of the Jewish
community as well.  He insisted that Jews
follow the law of Moses without elabora-
tion or addition, ensuring thus “the purity of
Jewish doctrine and its conformity to the
teachings of the Old Testament”11  and
protecting them from heresies within their
own tradition.12   He had become in effect
“the overseer of the rabbinate.”13   The
Church was helped in this not only by
converts, but by Karaites and by other
Jews who condemned Maimonides.  “You
are destroying your heretics,” wrote
Solomon ben Abraham to the Dominicans
of Montpellier (ca. 1232), “help us to
destroy our heretics.”14
None of this is to suggest any equiva-
lence between the forgettable contempo-
rary school curricula of the Middle East
and the works of Maimonides.  It is merely
to heighten our awareness of the various
motives different parties have in paying
attention to, criticizing, condemning and
seeking to have rewritten the educational
materials of others.  These motives are
hardly ever centered selflessly on the
interests of those others and often turn out
to be embarrassing, if not horrifying, in
retrospect.
Closer to our own time, the middle of
the nineteenth century saw imperial Britain
in the Middle East target education as the
source of the pervasive “fanaticism and
bigotry” it encountered in places like Egypt
and Yemen, as local religious scholars and
mosque functionaries insisted on treating
the Europeans as ritually impure infidels
rather than as moral superiors and avatars
of enlightenment.  Fanaticism and bigotry
as mental qualities helped administrators
explain the slow pace of economic and
political change and the occasional out-
breaks of political or religious violence.
“The Egyptian,” recalled Alfred Milner, the
former under-secretary for finance in
Egypt, “….is not by nature in the least
fanatical.  But he has been brought up in
fanatical traditions, and he is greatly under
the influence of religious teachers, who are
fanatics by profession.”15   Describing
Quranic education as it existed in the
1830s, one traveler wrote that religious
instruction in Egyptian village and urban
schools
turns principally upon the religious
observances required by the Quran,
and degenerates into extreme frivolity.
Rarely is any lesson of morality given,
and the passages of the Quran, which
teach the cultivation of the virtues, are
much less introduced and commented
on than those which bear upon the
ceremonials of the Mussulman faith.
Inquiries as to the quantity of adul-
teration, which makes water improper
for ablution ––  into the grammatical
turn of the language of prayer –– into
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the cases in which the obligations to
fast may be modified –– into the
gestures in adoration most acceptable
to Allah –– into the comparative
sanctity of different localities and
similar points –– are the controversies
which are deemed of the highest
importance, and the settlement of
which is supposed to confer a
paramount reputation upon the
Ulema.16
 “[T]he most worthless character” of such
pursuits disqualified this sort of education
as education at all.  Milner fumed that
….continually repeating, in a monoto-













gymnastic, if it be to exercise and
render supple the joints of the mind,
then this system is its very opposite,
for it tends to stiffen them.  It is not
calculated to enlighten, but to
obfuscate.17
Consequently, reformers hoped to revolu-
tionize the teaching of Islam to move
beyond rote memorization of text to include
explicit instruction in history and morality.
In this way, “the Quran might be made, like
the Bible, a means of imparting moral truth
combined with instructive history.  This is
not done, the poor little children’s nascent
powers are warped and stunted, and the
results appear when their higher education
is attempted.”18
The differences Europeans saw
between their own “moral” approach to
religion and the merely “ritual” concern of
Egyptians formed an important part both of
European self-understanding and of their
strategic intervention in Egyptian education,
religious and otherwise.  Offering small
monetary subsidies to local Quranic
schools in Egyptian villages that agreed to
submit to national inspections, and estab-
lishing a limited number of modern-style
schools to train Egyptians as local techni-
cians and government functionaries, the
colonial government sought to manage












absorbed in the bureaucracy.  But it was
Egyptians who were educated in these
modern schools and studied abroad in
Europe, who later became leaders of both
the secular Egyptian nationalist movement
and the modern Islamic movement that
helped lead insurrections against foreign
mastery of their country.  Their work to
disrupt British control flowed not from
radical cultural differences nurtured at
school, but from shared commitments to
modernity coupled with vast differences in
their practical political interests.  It is ironic
that our current complaints about Islamic
education no longer have to do with its
The evidence we have suggests
that students are rarely
motivated by schoolbook
lessons –– whether of tolerance
and mercy or exclusion and
violence.
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excessive focus on ritual, but rather with its
focus on moral truths and instructive
histories of which we don’t approve.  Both
then and now, what was meant by truth
and instruction is the kind of truth and
instruction that accomplishes our own
particular goals.  Given contemporary
concerns about the politicization of Middle
Eastern curricula, we might, now, actually
wish that religious education had stuck to
grammar and purity laws.
Currently the official religious educa-
tion programs in Egyptian government and
private schools carry on the traditions of
moral truth combined with instructive
history by teaching a vision of Islam that is
simultaneously exclusivist and quietist.  It is
exclusivist in that a generic Islam is
portrayed as the only truly legitimate
religious tradition.  It is a religious tradition,
however, that knows no borders of ethnic,
class, national or gender difference.
Muslims are different from others not
because they are a certain kind of people,
but because they have made a certain kind
of enlightened choice.  The same choice is
open to all mankind.  On the other hand, it
is a quietist and tolerant teaching, in that
Egyptian Muslims are taught to welcome
local Christians as members of the Egyp-
tian nation, as people who share ancient
cultural and national traditions, and to leave
the judging of fellow Muslims to those who
are charged with maintaining the religious
heritage: the official religious establish-
ment.19   Similar lessons of tolerance
suffuse most other national curricula in the
Middle East, as an international group of
scholars led by Eleanor Doumato of the
Watson Institute for International Affairs at
Brown University has recently shown.20
Apart from a few troubling passages in the
Saudi, Syrian and Iranian texts, incitements
to violence are absent, and those they did
discover were nearly always framed in
defensive terms.  One engages in violence
and yearns for martyrdom only when one
is under attack, not because God demands
the slaying of non-Muslims.  In any case,
the evidence we have suggests that
students are rarely motivated by school-
book lessons –– whether of tolerance and
mercy or exclusion and violence.  If this
most quotidian observation of any class-
room teacher is true, then why have
American leaders become so interested in
the contents of Middle Eastern curricula?
WHAT IS EDUCATION FOR?
Concerns about the cultural failures of
Middle Eastern schooling highlight by
implication three of the many different
contemporary goals of education.  Despite
his bellicose tone, Toby Ziegler articulated
an ideal of education as humanization, the
development of enlightenment through
liberal study.  Knowing more means
becoming more fully human.  Donald
Rumsfeld phrased the point of schooling as
a balance between social control and
political mobilization, while Colin Powell
repeated clichés about global competitive-
ness that frame schooling as a macroeco-
nomic strategy.  While Ziegler’s perspec-
tive derives from classical humanism,
Rumsfeld and Powell outline postmodern
ideals in which education becomes part of a
global just-in-time inventory system.  In the
1980s, we supported Pakistan’s recruitment
and training of Afghan mujahidin, which laid
part of the groundwork for the extensive
expansion of madrasas there.21   The U.S.
Agency for International Development
contracted with the Center for Afghanistan
Studies at the University of Nebraska at
Omaha to develop textbooks combining
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Islamic content with violently xenophobic
military themes and pictures for distribution
to schools in Afghanistan and refugee areas
of Pakistan.  These textbooks were
intended to militarize youth and reinforce
ideological opposition to the Soviet invasion
in Islamic terms.  Endlessly recirculated
and then partially censored by the removal
of human faces from the pictures, the
books later formed the core of the Taliban
school curriculum.22   Now, 20 years on, the
jihadi product line is to be discontinued in
favor of something else, perhaps Sufism.23
Postmodern theories of education, including
the ideology of “life-long learning,” are
opposed to classical humanism in that they
view humans not as perfectible individuals,
but as units constantly to be trained and
retrained to meet the changing needs of a
global economy.  Humanism –– and this
includes the traditions of religious training it
informed and from which it descends ––
shows us a fixed high goal of personal
development.  Postmodern education
provides us with no goal except to chase
endlessly the whims of global economic and
ideological markets.
Although we have for decades ex-
pressed our ideas in terms of human rights
rather than doctrinal purity, the assumptions
we make about the way schooling works in
the Middle East are similar to those the
medieval Popes made about Talmudic
education.  These assumptions were, first,
that parts of its content represent tenden-
tious distortions of true –– and therefore
necessarily universal –– religious doctrine.
Second, that this distortion has been
crafted by corrupt elders who wish to deny
their children the truth and keep them
entrapped in false consciousness.  Third,
that particular curricula create predictable
sets of knowledge and motivation in
students that reflect the intentions of their
producers. And finally, that these curricula
are the chief cause of some negative
behavior.
Each of these assumptions is problem-
atic.  Whatever the intentions of the
producers of these texts and whatever the
truth value of their content, it is nearly
impossible to attribute particular behaviors
to textual bases.  As Saif Dana has written
with regard to Palestinian schools, for
example, “Resistance [to Israel] stems
from real living conditions, and not from
ideas contained within the curriculum.”24
Likewise, the evidence we have is that
Mohammad Atta was radicalized not as an
impressionable young man in Egypt, where
he was presented with tolerant versions of
Islam through high school and studied
architecture at university, but in Germany,
where he was a graduate student in urban
planning.  While investigating the curricula
of German urban planning programs might
be amusing, it would probably not lead to
an explanation of why Atta and his com-
panions slit the throats of stewardesses and
rammed airplanes into skyscrapers.
People’s motivations have very little to do
with what they are told in school and much
to do with their interactions with members
of their families, their professional interests,
their personal tragedies and the broader
environment of experience.  Sociologist
David Reisman cautioned during the late
1940s against assuming
more than we….know about the
consequences of reading one or
another sort of book.  There is always
an element of indeterminacy in art; in
the relation of a reader to a book many
things –– many unintended things ––
can and do happen. . . .[W]hat is a
liberating book for one person may
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not be so for another –– a point often
overlooked by those who, nostalgi-
cally overestimating the uncorrupted
tastes of an earlier day, assume that all
those who read good books in the
eighteenth century or saw
Shakespeare’s plays in Elizabethan
days found the good things in them.25
This indeterminacy means that not only in
terms of books, but also in terms of other
socialization contexts, it is hard to pinpoint
what will appeal to a particular child.
Psychiatrist Anna Maria Rizzuto26 found
that her patients’ ideas about what God is
like corresponded closely to their percep-
tions of their parents, an insight whose
broader implications have been well
understood for decades –– if not centuries
–– by practical religious educators.27   It is
not merely specific sorts of living condi-
tions but networks of social support more
generally that shape particular behaviors.
As Yale anthropologist John Dollard
pointed out in the midst of World War II,
The real controls of individual
opinion are exercised by the intimate
social group to which the individual
belongs, and these cannot be blithely
supplanted by mere mass
propaganda….Prejudice is…in the
social environment, which punishes
us when we make any other than
prejudiced responses….Against such
massive processes one cannot work
very effectively by the indirect means
of books, radio or periodicals.  What
counts is the private behavior of the
group members in intimate situations.
As long as these social forces tend to
reward anti-Semitic expressions and
feelings, all other attempts to extirpate
them are bound to be ineffectual.28
PROXY WARS
Exposure to violent media –– the
Bible’s book of Joshua, chapter 8 of the
Quran, or Mel Gibson’s 2004 movie The
Passion of the Christ –– does not by itself
motivate violence or prejudice.  Even if
school curricula did act as causal mecha-
nisms, and even if we succeeded in
revolutionizing school curricula throughout
the Middle East, this would make little
difference, since the militant texts that Atta
read in Germany and later helped to
produce in the United States were part of a
vast underground literature.  It is a litera-
ture that originates and thrives largely
because it opposes and circulates outside
the control of official institutions.  Changing
the school without changing the media, the
Friday sermon at the mosque, the gossip of
friendship circles, and the brutality of
everyday life in regions of poverty, political
oppression and war will do little to bring
peace, Colin Powell to the contrary.  The
brutality and small-mindedness of the
Taliban came not from the content of their
education, but from its context: all-male
institutions established in regions of exile
and dispossession, cut off entirely from the
normal flow of economic and family life
which their young men would never
know.29    If, in more normal circum-
stances, political leaders in the Middle East
use schools as recruiting grounds for
military units, this is not very different from
the use to which American military recruit-
ers put high schools, which are required by
the No Child Left Behind Act to provide
the military with contact information on
their students.  Muslim militant groups also
use mosques for the same purposes of
recruitment.  As an American reporter
recorded in the 1940s when asking famous
bank robber Willie Sutton why he robbed
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banks, the answer was obvious: “Because
that’s where the money is.”  Schools (and
mosques) are where the young men are.
Neither social nor political conflict are
caused by one sort of training or another.
Training is a response to instrumental
needs rather than the cause of those
needs.  Conflict is caused by the social
institutions, political and economic inequali-
ties and opportunity structures that sur-
round those training institutions and prac-
tices in the broader world.  It’s true that
many children in the Middle East suffer
from dreadfully poor educational opportuni-
ties, which we are called upon by our










geography if these subjects have no real
use in rural areas of desperately poor
countries where entrenched elites have
little interest in altering the status quo?
Contrary to President Bush’s claim in the
2004 presidential debates, education by
itself does not create jobs.
Reform, according to Eleanor
Doumato, is a value-laden concept.  What
is made better by reform is always relative
to the interests of specific social groups.
With respect to religious education specifi-
cally, the most important thing about school
curricula may finally be not the effect they
have on private belief, but the contribution
they make in defining the terms of public
debate.  Changing them has to do with
changing the political tactics of elites rather
than the beliefs of the masses.  Forcing
change in curricula is merely a way to
force elites to publicly articulate different
ways of talking about conflict.  This can be
good and useful.  But when such change
happens due to outside pressure, it happens
because curricula are a relatively easy
thing to envision changing.  Rewriting
books is easier than changing fundamental
social, economic and political institutions
with powerful constituencies.  Not all elites
will be satisfied with these new ways of
talking, though, because curriculum reform
without the reform of infrastructure,
political participation and economic oppor-
tunity will do nothing to stem internal and
external conflicts








rural villages, the brutality of the Saudi
religious police, the legal persecution of
Egyptian homosexuals, the abuse of Iraqi
prisoners by American soldiers, targeted
assassinations by Algerian paramilitaries or
by Israeli pilots in American helicopters
(not to mention Israeli soldiers driving
American bulldozers) have far more
influence over the political consciousness
of children and youth than does anything
taught in school, religious or otherwise.
Which brings me, finally, to another
historical analogy with contemporary
resonance.  The biblical story of Eleazar
and the elephant from First Maccabees,
chapter 6, was retold by Josephus in the
first chapter of The Jewish War.  In 162
BCE, as Judah Maccabee was confronting
Forcing change in curricula is
merely a way to force elites to
publicly articulate different
ways of talking about conflict.
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the armies of the Seleucid king Antiochus
V, Judah’s younger brother Eleazar spotted
one of the king’s largest war elephants
bearing royal armor. Believing it was the
mount of the king himself, he decided to
make his reputation by bringing the animal
down and thereby ending the conflict.
Eleazar ducked underneath the beast and
thrust his weapon into its belly.  The
elephant collapsed and crushed Eleazar to
death underneath it.  The overwhelmed
Maccabbean armies retreated, and the
Greek forces did not withdraw until an
internal Seleucid power struggle forced the
king’s absence.
There are lessons for us here today.
King Antiochus was not, in fact, riding that
particular elephant, and Eleazar’s attack
did nothing except earn him everlasting
fame for having chosen the wrong target
and the wrong approach.  For it was not
the elephant who killed Eleazar.  Eleazar
was killed by the hopeful foolhardiness of
his own attack.  Just as the elephant itself
was not the cause of the war, textbooks
are not a primary cause of conflict.  They
do not directly motivate violence or, by
themselves, cause discriminatory predispo-
sitions or actions. Texts may be causes of
conflict in the sense that people get mad
about being insulted in other people’s
books.  But attacking the content of
curricula and pressuring change in them
provides local intellectuals and would-be
leaders with a powerful complaint with
which to rally their constituents, as intellec-
tuals and jurists in Jordan and Saudi Arabia
did in early January 2004, when those
countries announced U.S.-pressured
textbook reforms.  Exerting too heavy a
hand in the development of Middle Eastern
curricula, not to mention stepping into the
middle of contemporary debates about the
public role of Islam in Muslim countries
through public diplomacy efforts30  can play
into the hands of radicals whose arguments
about the illegitimacy of their own govern-
ments are strengthened by the specter of
foreign influence over what their children
read and hear.   Particularly in the context
of the American invasion of Iraq, President
Bush’s support for Ariel Sharon’s
unilateralism, and the long series of clumsy
American dealings with Iran, Pakistan,
Afghanistan and other countries in the
Middle East and Asia, our attempts at
pressuring school reform begin to look less
like an honest attempt to improve educa-
tional process, and more like an attempt to
hijack foreign school curricula for our own
narrow benefit.  In effect, it is fighting a
proxy war with Saudi Arabia in the schools
of Yemen, Egypt, Pakistan and Morocco.
School experiences are linked in
extremely complex ways with cultural
maintenance and change.  The unpleasant
content of distasteful curricula will change
when the unpleasant institutions in whose
midst they are written change, at their own
pace and, like the Seleucid withdrawal from
Judea, for reasons of their own.  The sad
thing is that Eleazar never had the opportu-
nity to learn that the king wasn’t riding that
particular elephant.  Perhaps we can.
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